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TRADEMARKS FOR THE CURE: WHY 
NONPROFITS NEED THEIR OWN SET OF 
TRADEMARK RULES 
Abstract: When the Lanham Trademark Act was originally drafted in 
1946, it is unlikely that Congress contemplated that trademarks would be 
used not only by commercial businesses but also by large nonprofits with 
a national reach. Today, several nonprofits have grown into highly recog-
nizable brands that wish to protect their valuable trademarks, both to en-
sure that donations reach their intended recipients and to preserve their 
good reputation in the eyes of the public. Nonprofit charities, though, 
undoubtedly have very different goals than for-profit enterprises and yet 
they are subject to the exact same set of trademark laws. This Note argues 
that, in light of the fundamental differences between commercial busi-
nesses and charitable organizations, amendments to the Lanham Trade-
mark Act are necessary. By carving out special rules for nonprofits within 
the Lanham Act, these charitable entities will receive the trademark pro-
tection they need and can focus on their charitable endeavors. 
Introduction 
 Trademark turf wars between profitable corporations make up a 
great deal of intellectual property litigation.1 Recently, Apple filed a suit 
to enjoin Amazon from using the trademarked “Appstore” as part of the 
new Kindle Fire hardware.2 It is highly unlikely that Apple will face criti-
cism for filing this action, as it is expected that a highly visible, hugely 
profitable entity like Apple would vigorously and zealously guard its 
                                                                                                                      
1 Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 Wash & Lee L. 
Rev. 585, 589 (2008) (discussing the rising number of cease and desist letters sent and 
trademark infringement actions filed by U.S. companies). In 2010, there was an eight per-
cent increase in the number of trademark cases filed in U.S. courts. Parija Kavilanz, Trade-
mark Wars Heat Up, CNNMoney (Dec. 1, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/01/ 
smallbusiness/trademark/index.htm. 
2 Suzanne Choney, Kindle Fire Added to Apple App Store Suit Against Amazon, NBC 
NEWS.com, (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/kindle-fire- 
added-apple-app-store-suit-against-amazon-118976. 
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brand.3 Yet, when well-known charitable organizations take similarly ag-
gressive action, public response is often notably different.4 
 In late 2010, the world’s leading breast cancer charity, Susan G. 
Komen for the Cure (“Komen”), found itself harshly judged in the court 
of public opinion when national media outlets ran a story that Komen 
had sent letters to a number of much smaller charities demanding that 
they not use the phrase “for the cure” in their fundraising efforts.5 
Long-time Komen supporter and comedian Stephen Colbert lam-
pooned the organization’s legal maneuvering on his show and many 
donors expressed their disapproval on Komen’s social media sites.6 
Other large, well-known nonprofits, including the Wounded Warriors 
Project and the University of Notre Dame, have also been criticized for 
using trademark litigation to aggressively protect their brand.7 
 Often, these disputes over nonprofit trademarks are settled out of 
court because organizations either do not have the resources to wage 
lengthy legal battles or do not wish to divert resources away from their 
philanthropic objectives.8 As a result, there is relatively little guidance 
from courts for addressing infringement cases when the parties are not 
commercial businesses.9 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Dan Pallotta, Is It Wrong to Sue a Charity?, Harv. Bus. Rev. Blog Network (Sep.29, 
2010, 2:11 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/pallotta/2010/09/is-it-wrong-to-sue-a-charity.html. 
4 See Clifford M. Marks, Charity Brawl: Nonprofits Aren’t So Generous When a Name’s at 
Stake, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 2010, at A1; Steve Spalding, Group’s Toucan Logo Ruffles Kellogg’s 
Feathers, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 23, 2011, at C1 (criticizing the Kellogg Company’s 
decision to pursue legal action against an educational nonprofit’s use of a toucan, that it 
believed was too similar to the Fruit Loops toucan for its logo); Pallotta, supra note 3. 
5 See Marks, supra note 4; Laura Bassett, Susan G. Komen Foundation Elbows Out Other Chari-
ties over Use of the Word ‘Cure,’ Huffington Post (Dec. 7, 2010, 12:41 PM), http://www.huff- 
ingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/komen-foundation-charities-cure_n_793176.html. 
6 Clare Howard, Komen Defends Its ‘For the Cure’ Trademark Protection, Peoria J. Star, Jan. 25, 
2011, http://www.pjstar.com/news/x448583826/Komen-defends-its-for-the-cure-trademark- 
protection; The Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/369693/january-03–2011/tip-wag—
susan-g—komen-foundation—spider-man-musial?. 
7 Jeremy Shapiro, Don’t Cheer for Old Notre Dame, Emporia Gazette, Oct. 25, 2011, 
http://www.emporiagazette.com/opinion/editorials/article_489b1897-0676-583b-ac68-84 
b869b0e2ea.html?_dc=211362552829.0868; Bruce D. Collins, Lawsuits Between Nonprofits 
Harm All, Inside Counsel (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/03/01/ 
lawsuits-between-nonprofits-harm-all. 
8 See Christopher T. Ward, Who’s Afraid of the Big, Friendly Nonprofit? Saber Rattling and 
the Sad State of Affairs for Small Charitable Nonprofits and Trademark Law, 11 Wake Forest 
Intell. Prop. L.J. 295, 297 (2011) (noting that many nonprofit trademark actions are 
settled before trial); Marks, supra note 4. 
9 See Ward, supra note 8, at 297. 
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 Given the fundamental differences between nonprofit organiza-
tions and for-profit commercial enterprises, it seems reasonable that 
the law might provide a different set of trademark rules for charitable 
groups and perhaps provide even greater protection for the marks of 
well-known nonprofits that work to serve a substantial number of peo-
ple.10 After all, federal tax law provides charitable groups with tax-
exempt status because a nonprofit’s earnings all go into the organiza-
tion and do not benefit private shareholders.11 
 Unfortunately for nonprofits with trademarks, the Lanham Trade-
mark Act (“Lanham Act” or “Act”), the federal statutory scheme that 
outlines the trademark registration process and provides protection 
from infringement, offers no special protection for nonprofits.12 In fact, 
based on the plain language of the statute, nonprofits may actually be 
barred from bringing claims for dilution, which is one of the most 
common infringement problems.13 Further, the 2004 U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 
now permits a defendant to prevail even where there is some confusion 
between two trademarks.14 In the nonprofit world, this holding essen-
tially could allow the concurrent use of similar trademarks despite the 
potential for donor confusion that could lead to funds ending up with 
an unintended recipient.15 
 This Note argues that although there is not much case law or statu-
tory law applying specifically to nonprofit trademark litigation, the time 
is ripe for an amendment to the Lanham Act that lays out specific pro-
tections for nonprofits and their trademarks.16 Komen, a global organi-
zation with a reach and media presence that could not have been imag-
ined when the Lanham Act was enacted in 1946, relies largely on its 
recognizable brand to continue carrying out its mission.17 By aggres-
sively protecting its brand, Komen avoids donor confusion and is able 
to maintain its reputation and continue its work as the world’s leading 
                                                                                                                      
10 See infra notes 178–186 and accompanying text. 
11 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). An organization shall be exempt from taxation 
provided that “no part of [its] net earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual.” Id. 
12 See infra notes 90–95, 110–112 and accompanying text. 
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); infra notes 101–106 and accompanying text. 
14 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121, 124 
(2004); Ward, supra note 8, at 308 (explaining how the KP Make-Up holding affects non-
profit trademark cases). 
15 See KP Make-Up, 543 U.S at 124; infra notes 83–92 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 168–218 and accompanying text. 
17 See Press Release, Susan G. Komen for the Cure, For the Cure ( Jan. 25, 2011), http:// 
blog.komen.org/?p=277. 
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organization for breast cancer research and fundraising.18 Thus, large 
nonprofits have the same strong interest in protecting their brands as 
for-profit companies—and perhaps an even greater one—because the 
work of these organizations affects the greater public as both potential 
donors and recipients.19 
 Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the general princi-
ples and objectives of trademark law.20 Part II first explores how an or-
ganization’s charitable involvement affects the trademark analysis and 
then examines recent actions involving charitable entities.21 Lastly, Part 
III explains why charitable trademarks are deserving of enhanced pro-
tection, and proposes changes to the Lanham Act and the trademark 
application process that apply specifically to nonprofits.22 
I. Trademark Rights in American Law 
 The idea of protecting marks that identify the source of goods or 
services is well established in the law.23 Currently, in the United States, 
trademark holders may only use the mark in connection with a speci-
fied organization, good, or service, but may control the mark for as 
                                                                                                                      
18 See id. Komen released a statement on its website explaining, 
If we’ve been perhaps a bit overzealous in protecting our name, it’s because 
we feel a huge responsibility to our family of volunteers and donors and all of 
those who are helped by our mission to discover and deliver the cures for 
breast cancer. 
. . . . 
It would be a disservice to all those who put their trust in us if we did not take 
responsible steps to protect our name. We believe it is critical for people to 
understand where their donations are going, and we feel an obligation to our 
donors to make that as clear as possible. The millions of people who either 
support us or benefit from our programs know and trust our name – Susan G. 
Komen for the Cure. We want them to continue to feel confident that their 
money is being used to fight and treat breast cancer and to fund the best sci-
entific research. 
Id. 
19 See infra notes 178–186 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 23–109 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 110–167 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 168–218 and accompanying text. 
23 Port, supra note 1, at 595. English courts allowed producers of goods to protect identi-
fying marks as early as the seventeenth century. Id. Please note that the terms mark and 
trademark are used interchangeably both by courts and in scholarship. Id; see, e.g., KP Make-
Up, 543 U.S at 117–18; Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Children of the World Found., Ltd., 99 
F. Supp. 2d 481, 489–91 (D.N.J. 2000); J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition § 2:14 (4th ed. 2012). 
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long as they are using it, which makes trademark rights particularly 
powerful.24 
 This Part explains both the principles behind trademark law and 
how the Lanham Act protects source-identifying marks.25 Section A dis-
cusses the overarching purpose of trademark law and the protections it 
provides and details the Lanham Act’s legislative history.26 Section B 
explains the registration process for trademarks under the Lanham 
Act.27 Finally, Section C describes how trademark holders assert their 
rights and the claims they may raise in infringement actions.28 
A. The Principles and Purposes of Trademark Law and the Lanham Act 
 In order to protect consumers and trademark holders throughout 
the United States, Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946.29 The 
Act established a federal trademark registration system and provided 
uniform protections to trademark holders.30 Prior to the Lanham Act, 
trademark law was a mix of state common law and federal statutes, 
which led to inconsistent judicial decisions about the rights of trade-
mark holders.31 These inconsistent decisions, combined with the in-
creasing nationalization of the U.S. economy, led Congress to deter-
mine that state common law did not provide producers and consumers 
with adequate, uniform protection of their marks.32 The Act adopted 
most common law elements of trademark protection but also broad-
                                                                                                                      
24 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (stating that 
trademark rights are limited to source-identifying uses in conjunction with a product or 
service); McCarthy, supra note 23, §§ 3:1, 17:9 (stating that trademark rights stem from 
the continued use of the mark in the public). 
25 See infra notes 29–109 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 29–47 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 48–68 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 69–109 and accompanying text. 
29 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); McCarthy, supra note 23, § 5.4 (discussing the efforts to 
pass a comprehensive federal trademark statute that culminated in the passage of the 
Lanham Act in 1946). 
30 See McCarthy, supra note 23, § 5.4 (discussing the Senate Committee on Patents’ 
argument that a new comprehensive federal law was necessary to ensure efficient and uni-
form resolutions of trademark cases throughout the nation). 
31 See id. 
32 See id. (noting that Congress sought to place substantive trademark law into one uni-
form statute to combat growing concerns over fraud and misrepresentation of goods to 
consumers and the misallocation of goodwill to incorrect producers and organizations). 
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ened trademark protection by adding a constructive notice rule that 
significantly expanded the geographic scope of trademark rights.33 
 Trademark law aims to protect the general public from confusion 
about the origin of goods and services in the market.34 Consumers (or 
donors, in the case of a nonprofit organization) closely associate a 
strong mark with the trademark holder’s product or organization.35 The 
mark allows for a quick identification, which prevents confusion, mis-
take, and deception about the entity behind the mark and signals any 
positive public connotations associated with the mark.36 When a person 
sees a trademark, it allows them to identify the source of the product 
and to quickly distinguish it from others.37 Thus, the trademark pro-
vides an assurance of consistent quality and reduces an individual’s 
search costs.38 
                                                                                                                     
 Furthermore, trademark law protects the investment and effort of 
the trademark holder.39 Sellers and organizations expend considerable 
time and resources building their brands and developing the goodwill 
of the public.40 Expending money to maintain and improve a product’s 
 
33 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006); Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition § 19(e) (1995) (clarifying the purpose behind the passing of the Lanham Act 
and noting the innovation of the 1946 Act). The Lanham Act’s federal registration system 
fosters a policy of national trademark protection “by limiting instances of territorial fragmen-
tation and concurrent rights.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 19(e). 
Moreover, a later amendment to the Lanham Act expanded the geographic scope of priority 
for registered marks through the concept of “constructive use.” 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). Section 
1057(c), provides that, contingent upon ultimate registration, the filing of an application for 
registration on the principal register constitutes “constructive use of the mark, conferring a 
right of priority, nationwide in effect,” against others who have not previously used the mark 
or filed an application for its registration. Id. Registering a trademark is “thus equivalent to 
nationwide use.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 19(e). 
34 See McCarthy, supra note 23, § 2:2 (discussing the purpose of trademark protection 
and the effect of the Federal Trademark Act of 1946). 
35See Children of the World Found., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 490; Mary LaFrance, Understand-
ing Trademark Law § 2.04 (2d ed. 2009). 
36 Platinum Home Mortg. Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 
1998); Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Au-
thorship, Appropriation, and the Law 60 (1998). 
37 See Coombe, supra note 36, at 60. 
38 Id., see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Per-
spective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 270 (1987) (discussing how trademarks reduce individuals’ 
information search costs). 
39 See Noah D. Bleicher, Trademarking Tragedy: The Fight for Exclusive Rights to “Let’s Roll,” 
52 Emory L.J. 1850, 1851 (2003). 
40 See Coombe, supra note 36, at 61 (“The trademark owner is viewed as a quasi-author 
who creates a particular set of meanings attached to a mark by investing time, labor, and 
money, thereby justifying expansive rights in a mark.”) (citing Keith Aoki, Authors, Inven-
tors, and Trademark Owners: Private and Intellectual Property and the Public Domain , 18 Colum.-
VLA J.L. & Arts 191, 235(1994)). 
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quality thereby increases the value of the trademark.41 Trademark 
rights protect this effort by preventing other companies or organiza-
tions from capitalizing on the recognition and goodwill that another’s 
mark has earned.42 
 The Lanham Act defines a trademark as, “any word, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof” that is used by the holder of the 
mark to distinguish the holder’s organization or goods in the market-
place.43 Both the courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office have 
interpreted this language broadly and granted trademark protections 
not only to images and names, but also to colors, sounds, and even 
scents.44 
 Although the original purpose of the Act was to protect both con-
sumers and sellers from misrepresentation and fraud in the market-
place, the Act ultimately created a strong policy favoring trademark 
holders by establishing a cause of action for trademark infringement.45 
Section 1125 of the Lanham Act explicitly states that infringers “shall 
be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or 
is likely to be damaged by such [infringing] act,” thereby providing 
trademark holders with a federal cause of action.46 In interpreting the 
Lanham Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that trademarks 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (noting that 
trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the holder 
the benefits of good reputation); Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 270. 
42 See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198; Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 269. 
43 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
44 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (upholding the 
trademark of a specific shade combination of green-gold for dry cleaner pads); In re 
Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1240 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (affirming trademark protection 
for a plumeria scent for sewing threads). 
45 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (outlining the circumstances under which a trademark 
holder may bring an infringement claim); McCarthy, supra note 23, § 5:4 (noting con-
gressional concern over protecting both the public and producers of goods from misrep-
resentations in the marketplace). 
46 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The statute states, in pertinent part: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or mis-
leading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which—(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another per-
son, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a civil action 
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such 
act. 
Id. 
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must be protected because they (1) help consumers identify specific 
goods, services or organizations; (2) guarantee a certain standard of 
quality of the product related to a particular trademark; and (3) pro-
vide useful tools for advertising and sales, where the trademark is asso-
ciated with a widely known product or organization.47 
B. Registering Trademark Rights Under the Lanham Act 
 The federal trademark registration process, as laid out in § 1051 of 
the Lanham Act, provides the best option for national nonprofits like 
Komen.48 Federal registration makes the most sense for large, far-
reaching nonprofits because it extends a trademark holder’s exclusive 
rights throughout the United States.49 Further, a federally registered 
trademark serves as clear proof of the holder’s exclusive right to use 
the trademark across the entire United States, thus making the mark 
far easier to protect.50 Additionally, a federally registered mark provides 
constructive notice to any would-be infringers across the country be-
cause trademark registrations are accessible to the public.51 It is impor-
tant to note, though, that no registration is required to establish trade-
mark rights if a mark is capable of identifying its source to the public.52 
 The ease of establishing protection and the ultimate strength of 
the trademark are tied to the mark’s distinctiveness.53 The strength of a 
mark is a key factor for many courts in analyzing confusion causes of 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64; Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198. 
48 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
49 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (“Any registration . . . of a mark registered on the [federal] 
register provided by this chapter . . . shall be prima facie evidence of . . . the registrant’s 
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark 
. . . .”); LaFrance, supra note 35, § 1.08. 
50 See LaFrance, supra note 35, § 1.08; see also John Grady & Steve McKelvey, Trademark 
Protection of School Colors: Colorful Legal Debate for the Collegiate Licensing Industry, 18 J. Legal 
Aspects Sport 207, 211 (2008). Courts have found that registration of a trademark cre-
ates a presumption that the mark is valid and therefore protected. See, e.g., Tie Tech, Inc. v. 
Kinedyne Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002); Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capi-
tal Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999). 
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (describing the publication process for registered trade-
marks). 
52 See LaFrance, supra note 35, § 2.17 (noting that § 1125 of the Lanham Act does not 
impose a registration requirement in order to establish protection from confusion or dilu-
tion). 
53 See Mark McKenna, Teaching Intellectual Property Law: Teaching Trademark Theory 
Through the Lens of Distinctiveness, 52 St. Louis L.J. 843, 847–48 (2008); see also Randall L. 
Newsom, Note, Cease and Desist: Finding an Equitable Solution in Trademark Disputes Between 
High Schools and Colleges, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1833, 1840–41 (2011) (discussing how the distinct-
iveness of a mark relates to its protection under trademark law). 
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action under § 1125(a).54 To assess a trademark’s distinctiveness, courts 
have classified trademarks into four categories: arbitrary and fanciful, 
suggestive, descriptive, and generic.55 
 Trademarks that come under the umbrella of the first two catego-
ries are considered intrinsically distinctive and therefore, they can be 
registered without showing any secondary meaning in relation to their 
sources.56 Fanciful marks have been completely fabricated by the mark 
holders and have no dictionary meaning, such as “Clorox” for bleach 
or “Xerox,” for copying equipment.57 Arbitrary marks, by contrast, are 
commonly used words that in no way describe the goods or services to 
which they are attached.58 For example, the term “Apple” is an arbi-
trary mark for computer products but would be generic for the fruit 
and other products using apples as an ingredient.59 
 Although less strong than arbitrary or fanciful marks, suggestive 
marks are also considered inherently distinctive as they convey only an 
indirect impression of the goods or services to which they are at-
tached.60 These marks thus require the consumer to use “imagination, 
thought and perception” to determine the source behind the mark.61 
Examples of marks that courts have determined to be suggestive in-
clude “Citibank” for banking services and “Wite-Out” for correction 
fluid.62 
                                                                                                                      
54 See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding Co., 696 F.3d 206, 
216–17, 225–26 (2d Cir. 2012); Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2004); Dieter v. B & 
H Indus., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1989); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 
348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Co., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961); see also LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.02 (noting that the strength of a mark is a 
“universally recognized” factor in a confusion claim analysis). 
55 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting Co., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976) (dis-
cussing the differences between the four categories of four trademarks and holding that 
the word “safari” could fit into more than one category depending on what type of prod-
uct was being described); McKenna, supra note 53, at 848. 
56 See Abercrombie, 537 F.3d at 11; LaFrance, supra note 35, § 2.07. The strongest marks 
are those that fall into the fanciful and arbitrary mark category. LaFrance, supra note 35, 
§ 2.07. 
57 LaFrance, supra note 35, § 2.07; see Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 
624 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing examples of fanciful marks). 
58 See McCarthy, supra note 23, § 11:11. 
59 See LaFrance, supra note 35, § 2.07. 
60 See Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1040 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (defining suggestive marks); LaFrance, supra note 35, § 2.07. 
61 Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1040. 
62 See DeGidio v. West Grp. Corp., 355 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2004); Sara Lee Corp. v. 
Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 465 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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 Conversely, descriptive marks describe a quality, characteristic, or 
function of the attached product or service.63 These marks only receive 
trademark protection if they have acquired a secondary meaning such 
that the public mentally connects the mark with a specific source.64 Ex-
amples of descriptive marks include “Super Glue” for fast-drying glue 
and “Yellow Pages” for phone directories with yellow pages.65 
 Finally, generic terms and images are per se ineligible for trade-
mark protection because they are overly general and therefore do not 
signify a particular source or organization to the public.66 The test for 
genericness is “whether the public perceives the term primarily as the 
designation of the article.”67 Formerly protected trademarks such as 
“asprin,” “thermos,” and “trampoline” no longer receive trademark 
protection because the public uses these terms to describe the actual 
article to which the mark was attached instead of the entity behind the 
product.68 
C. Asserting Federal Trademark Rights 
 A trademark holder may bring an infringement claim for action 
that is likely to cause confusion or the dilution of his or her mark, or 
both.69 Originally, trademark law only addressed infringing activity that 
was likely to cause confusion, but Congress amended the Lanham Act 
in 1996 to include a new cause of action, “dilution.”70 This amendment 
was intended to protect trademark holders from unauthorized uses of 
their marks that could potentially diminish the value and strength of a 
mark’s reputation, even if there was no potential for confusion.71 
 This Section begins by discussing infringement claims for con-
sumer confusion, and the factors courts use to assess the likelihood of 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1040; Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 
747 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1984). 
64 See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting 
that the most essential element of secondary meaning for a descriptive mark is the impres-
sion in a buyer’s mind). 
65 See Sara Lee, 81 F.3d at 464. 
66 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. 
67 Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1041. 
68 See LaFrance, supra note 35, § 2.07. 
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a), (c) (2006). 
70 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 
985, 986 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)); see also LaFrance, supra note 35, § 1.05 
(discussing the 1996 amendment to the Lanham Act, which added dilution as another 
available trademark infringement claim). 
71 See LaFrance, supra note 35, § 1.05. 
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confusion.72 It then explores the more recent dilution amendments, 
and how they broaden the scope of trademark protection.73 
1. Confusion Claims 
 Because the federal trademark system was established to protect 
both consumers and trademark holders, § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act 
provides a cause of action for trademark holders against anyone who 
uses a trademark, without the holder’s permission, in any way that is 
reasonably likely to cause confusion in the minds of consumers.74 
When considering a trademark infringement claim, courts use a two-
step analysis: a plaintiff must first establish that they have a valid and 
enforceable trademark, and then must show that the mark was used in 
a way that is likely to confuse consumers as to its source.75 
                                                                                                                     
 The federal courts of appeals each use their own slightly different 
multi-factor balancing tests as a flexible guide to decide whether a de-
fendant’s use of a registered mark will cause confusion in the market.76 
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applies 
an eight factor test, first laid out in 1961 in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec-
tronics Corp., in confusion causes of action.77 These eight independent 
elements, generally referred to as the Polaroid factors, are: (1) the 
strength of the senior mark, (2) the similarity of the marks, (3) the 
proximity of the parties; (4) the likelihood the prior holder “will bridge 
the gap,” (5) the evidence of actual confusion, (6) the intent of the de-
fendant, (7) the quality of the defendant’s product, and (8) the buyer’s 
sophistication.78 The court in Polaroid also noted that other factors may 
be taken into account depending on the complexity of the issues in a 
particular case.79 
 
72 See infra notes 74–95 and accompanying text. 
73 See infra notes 96–109 and accompanying text. 
74 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
75 See id.; Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., 508 F.3d 641, 648 n.8 (11th Cir. 
2007) (holding that a court will not evaluate the likelihood of confusion where ownership 
rights are not clearly established); Lampanello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(same); LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.02 (explaining the two-step analysis for evaluating a 
traditional trademark claim under § 1114 of the Lanham Act). 
76 See Sullivan, 385 F.3d at 775–76; Dieter, 880 F.2d at 326; AMF, 599 F.2d at 348–49; 
Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978); see also 
LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.02 (discussing the different factor tests and the similarities in 
their applications). 
77 Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.; LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.02. 
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 Although different circuits use slightly different factors in their 
tests, the circuits are similar in that each factor is weighed independ-
ently in a highly fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the defen-
dant infringed the plaintiff’s trademark.80  Accordingly, no single factor 
is decisive.81 Moreover, because the lists of factors are non-exhaustive, 
there is no guaranteed uniformity in how the tests are applied both 
within and among the circuits, and courts are allowed to take into con-
sideration any facts and circumstances relevant to the particular case.82 
 The confusion analysis became even more complicated in 2004 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in KP Make-Up, which involved the 
availability of a fair use defense for trademark infringement.83 The fair 
use defense is available to would-be infringers under § 1115(b)(4).84 
The statute provides a defense for the use of a protected mark where 
“the use . . . charged to be an infringement is a use . . . of a term or de-
vice which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to de-
scribe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin.”85 
Essentially, this affirmative defense is available where the alleged in-
fringer (1) did not use plaintiff’s mark as its own trademark, (2) used 
the mark in good faith without intent to capitalize on its similarity to 
the plaintiff’s mark, and (3) used the mark only as a means of describ-
ing its own goods or services.86 
 Prior to this decision, a potentially infringing defendant could not 
raise a fair use defense until the defendant clearly proved that there was 
no potential for confusion.87 In KP Make-Up, the Court held that a fair 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Internet Specialties West, Inc. v. Milion-Digiorgio Enters., 559 F.3d 985, 989 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); LaFrance, 
supra note 35, § 3.02. 
81 See Entrepreneur Media v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001); Eli Lilly & Co. 
v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2000); LaFrance, supra note 35, 
§ 3.02. 
82 See Ward, supra note 8, at 306, 308; LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.02. 
83 See 543 U.S. 111, 121–22 (2004) (holding that some level of confusion by members 
of the public is permissible in certain trademark infringement cases where the defendant 
argues that the use of the mark was a fair use). 
84 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). 
85 Id. 
86 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the 
defendant’s burden of proof in raising a fair use defense in a trademark infringement 
action). 
87 See KP Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 117, 121 (discussing prior decisions involving confusion 
claims and the fair use defense); PACAAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the finding of a likelihood of confusion forecloses a fair use de-
fense); Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(finding that the alleged infringers were free to use words contained in a trademark “in 
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use defense could stand even where some confusion existed or was like-
ly to exist.88 Thus, under this holding, a defendant who has used an-
other’s trademark without permission may successfully raise a fair use 
defense even when the purported “fair use” creates confusion.89 
 Because confusion causes of action are available to all trademark 
holders, the KP Make-Up holding allows a fair use defense to be raised 
not only where consumers are confused as to the source of goods in the 
market, but also where potential donors are confused about which 
nonprofit they are supporting.90 There are often a great number of 
both large and small charities working on behalf of similar causes, and 
therefore tremendous potential for public confusion regarding the 
names of nonprofit organizations.91 Under KP Make-Up, it is possible 
that two organizations could have very similar marks and the second 
user might be permitted to keep using the mark even where donors 
were confused and misdirecting contributions, provided that the sec-
ond user used the mark for description and in good faith.92 
 It should be noted that there is not much case law in this area be-
cause most nonprofit confusion claims are not fully litigated to deci-
sion.93 Charities often opt to settle out of court because they either lack 
the funding to wage a full legal battle or do not want to divert funds 
from their mission.94 When nonprofit cases do actually reach trial, 
courts have generally expressed great concern over confusion in the 
nonprofit context.95 
                                                                                                                      
their ordinary, descriptive sense,” so long as such use did not confuse customers as to the 
source of the goods); Ward, supra note 8, at 317 (discussing the availability of the fair use 
defense before KP Make-Up). 
88 See KP Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 121–22, 124. 
89 See id. at 124; LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.12 (explaining the impact of the KP 
Make-Up holding). 
90 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); KP Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124; Ward, supra note 8, at 317 (dis-
cussing the potential impact of the KP Make-Up holding on nonprofit trademark cases). 
91 See Ward, supra note 8, at 305 (discussing the high potential for likelihood of confu-
sion claims between nonprofit entities). 
92 See KP Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124; Ward, supra note 8, at 317 (explaining that smaller 
charitable organizations have a greater chance of defeating a senior organization’s trade-
mark infringement claim by fair use “because there is no longer a requirement to show 
that consumer confusion is not likely” under KP Make-Up). 
93 See Ward, supra note 8, at 297 (“Many organizations settle in the face of impossible 
legal fees, and as a result there is almost no case law analysis where larger organizations sue 
small nonprofits.”). 
94 See id.; Marks, supra note 4. 
95 See WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors Family Support, Inc. (Wounded Warriors II ), 628 
F.3d 1032, 1043–44 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[A nonprofit entity’s] financial credit—its ability to 
raise funds, its general reputation, the reputation of those managing and supporting it, are 
all at stake if its name is used by some other organization and the two become confused in 
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2. Dilution: Expanding Trademark Protection for Senior Mark Holders 
 Congress amended the Lanham Act in 1996 by adding the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), which expanded trademark infringe-
ment claims beyond situations involving directly competing marks.96 
This significant amendment established a federal cause of action against 
use that could tarnish or devalue a senior user’s mark.97 The new 
amendment aimed primarily to protect senior trademark holders that 
had expended significant money and effort in developing brands and 
establishing goodwill from the “lessening . . . [of] the capacity of [their] 
famous mark,” even where there was no genuine threat of confusion 
with a competing brand or organization.98 
 Whereas trademark infringement law up until this point had fo-
cused primarily on protecting the public from confusion about the 
source behind the mark, the anti-dilution amendment sought to ex-
pressly safeguard “the trademark owner’s investment in the goodwill 
that is embodied in a mark,” even where there was no chance for con-
fusion.99 With the passage of this amendment, Congress allowed even 
greater protection to the most famous trademark holders by establish-
ing a cause of action rooted in the idea that where a mark is so preva-
                                                                                                                      
the minds of the public.”); Children of the World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 494 (“[T]he public also 
has a right to know to whom they are giving their money and who is administering these 
services.”); Cancer Research Inst., Inc. v. Cancer Research Soc’y, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1051, 
1055–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“In the Court’s view, the level of recognition and achievement 
arrived at by plaintiff entitles it to protection from later formed organizations using con-
fusingly similar names.”). 
96 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985, 
986 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)); see Blake R. Bertagna, Poaching Profits: 
An Examination of the Ability of a Trademark Owner to Recover Infringer’s Profits Under the Lan-
ham Act as Amended in 1999, 16 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 257, 261–62 (2008) (discussing the 
initial question of how to better protect mark holders that led to the adoption of the 
FTDA). 
97 See LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.05 (describing the legislative history and intent be-
hind the passage of the FDTA); see also Bertagna, supra note 96, at 266–67 (explaining that 
Congress recognized that the dilution of well-known marks had become a greater problem 
during the 1990s and enacted the dilution amendment to better protect “those marks with 
such powerful consumer associations that even non-competing uses can impinge on their 
value”). The term “senior user” means the entity or individual who first used a trademark 
in the public. See A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 210, 
212 (3d Cir. 2000); Children of the World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 49. 
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); see also Bertagna, supra note 96, at 266–68 (explaining the 
FDTA’s broadening of trademark protection and describing the remedies now available 
under the Lanham Act). 
99 See LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.05 (differentiating between the protections pro-
vided by traditional trademark law and those provided by the anti-dilution amendment). 
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lent in the public, even non-competing uses could diminish the mark’s 
effectiveness.100 
 A decade after passing the initial anti-dilution legislation, Congress 
broadened its scope by passing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
(TDRA).101 The TDRA requires only a mere likelihood of dilution ra-
ther than proof of actual dilution.102 Thus, this recent amendment 
perpetuated the expansion of federal statutory protection for senior 
trademark holders.103 
 Although the anti-dilution amendment provides a powerful tool 
for most senior mark holders, its power may be significantly hindered 
in the charitable nonprofit context.104 Dilution claims may only be 
brought in commercial settings under § 1125(c) of the Lanham Act, 
unlike confusion claims which have no such restriction.105 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                      
 
100 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); McCarthy, supra note 23, § 5:10–11 (discussing the effects 
of the amendment to the anti-dilution laws). The Ninth Circuit offered the following ex-
ample of how dilution can occur even in non-competing markets: 
For example, if a cocoa maker began using the “Rolls Royce” mark to identify 
its hot chocolate, no consumer confusion would be likely to result. Few would 
assume that the car company had expanded into the cocoa making business. 
However, the cocoa maker would be capitalizing on the investment the car 
company had made in its mark. Consumers readily associate the mark with 
highly priced automobiles of a certain quality. By identifying the cocoa with 
the Rolls Royce mark, the producer would be capitalizing on consumers’ as-
sociation of the mark with high quality items. Moreover, by labeling a differ-
ent product “Rolls Royce,” the cocoa company would be reducing the ability 
of the mark to identify the mark holder’s product. If someone said, “I’m go-
ing to get a Rolls Royce, others could no longer be sure the person was plan-
ning on buying an expensive automobile. The person might just be planning 
on buying a cup of coffee. Thus, the use of the mark to identify the hot choc-
olate, although not causing consumer confusion, would cause harm by dilut-
ing the mark. 
Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2002). 
101 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312 (2006) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). 
102 See id. 
103 See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 625, 638–40 
(discussing the effects of expanding statutory protection for famous mark holders). 
104 See Ward, supra note 8, at 310. 
105 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). The statute states in pertinent part: 
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinc-
tive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an in-
junction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has 
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is 
likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous 
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition, or of actual economic injury. . . . The following shall not be ac-
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as nonprofits operate outside the commercial world, a charitable or-
ganization may not, based on the plain language of § 1125(c), pursue a 
dilution claim even if the group reasonably believed that it was suffer-
ing because another organization was chipping away at its well-known 
and respected name.106 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite the plain language of the statute, courts have, in some in-
stances, found trademark infringement for dilution in nonprofit cas-
es.107 These courts were less concerned with a strict statutory interpre-
tation, and more concerned about the tarnishment of recognizable 
charitable organizations, which could impair their ability to carry out 
their missions.108 The courts in these cases opted to reach their deci-
sions not by focusing on stringent plain language, but by remaining 
true to the legislative intent behind the dilution amendments, which 
was to broaden trademark protection for senior mark holders and their 
valuable brands.109 
II. Trademarks for a Cause 
 Given the markedly different objectives of commercial entities and 
nonprofits, one might reasonably think that different rules would apply 
in situations involving the trademark rights of a charitable organiza-
tion.110 Indeed, the tax code treats nonprofit organizations differently 
than commercial enterprises, rewarding these organizations with a 
preferential tax status because they aim to benefit the public good and 
rely on the donations of others.111 Yet the Lanham Act contains no spe-
cial provisions for nonprofit trademarks.112 
 
 
tionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsec-
tion . . . any noncommercial use of a mark. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
106 See Ward, supra note 8, at 310 (explaining the statutory limitations on dilution 
claims in nonprofit actions). 
107 See Rd. Dawgs Motorcycle Club of the U.S., Inc. v. “Cuse” Rd. Dawgs, Inc., 679 F. 
Supp. 2d 259, 285 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (considering, as a factor in the confusion analysis, 
whether the senior trademark could be tarnished as a result of the public associating it 
with the newer similar mark); Children of the World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (holding that an 
older, well-known nonprofit’s goodwill with donors was likely to be tarnished as a result of 
a newer organization, working on behalf of the same cause, using a similar name). 
108 See Rd. Dawgs, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Children of the World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 493. 
109 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Rd. Dawgs, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Children of the World, 99 F. 
Supp. 2d at 493; LaFrance, supra note 35, § 3.05. 
110 See Ward, supra note 8, at 301, 326 (highlighting the differences in goals of com-
mercial entities and nonprofit organizations). 
111 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Ward, supra note 8, at 301 (“Charitable nonprofits 
are required to act in accordance with section 501(c)(3), or they risk losing their non-
2013] Why Nonprofits Need Their Own Set of Trademark Rules 259 
 Section A of this Part explores the legal and social consequences 
that arise when two nonprofit organizations, both presumably trying to 
perform socially beneficial work, become engaged in a trademark bat-
tle.113 Section B then describes the recent, highly publicized contro-
versy that stemmed from Susan G. Komen for the Cure’s zealous at-
tempts to protect its trademarks.114 
A. Turf Wars: Court Involvement in Nonprofit Trademark Actions 
 Case law involving trademark disputes between nonprofit organi-
zations is somewhat sparse because nonprofit organizations often pre-
fer to reach a settlement rather than face a protracted legal battle that 
directs resources away from their overarching missions.115 In the rare 
event that a case involving charities is litigated to a final judgment, 
courts have typically found for more well-established organizations, 
which are at risk of losing out on misdirected donations when smaller 
organizations begin to use similar names.116 
 In 2000, in Deborah Heart & Lung Center v. Children of the World 
Foundation, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted 
the plaintiff organization an injunction against the defendant’s contin-
ued use of the “Children of the World” mark in connection with the 
defendant’s competing charitable fundraising and medical services.117 
The Deborah Heart and Lung Center Foundation operated a global 
outreach program, known as “Children of the World,” that provided 
life-saving surgeries for children with congenital heart defects.118 The 
organization had no registered trademark that would clearly establish 
                                                                                                                      
profit status. Therefore, these charitable nonprofits’ humanitarian motives and nonprofit 
methods must be part of the trademark analysis.”). 
112 See Kenneth E. Liu, Why Should Nonprofits Care About Trademarks?, Thomson Com-
pumark (2010), http://trademarks.thomsonreuters.com/article/why-should-nonprofits-
care-about-trademarks (“[T]he protection of nonprofit marks is no different from that of 
for-profits.”). 
113 See infra notes 115–144 and accompanying text. 
114 See infra notes 145–167 and accompanying text. 
115 See Ward, supra note 8, at 297; Press Release, Susan G. Komen for the Cure, Trade-
mark Statement ( Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.komenoregon.org/Newsroom/Komen_Trade 
mark_Issues.shtml (“Susan G. Komen for the Cure has sought amicable resolutions in the 47 
trademark cases we’ve encountered in our 30 years; we have no interest in impeding the 
good work of other non-profits.”). 
116 WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors Family Support, Inc. (Wounded Warriors II ), 628 
F.3d 1032, 1036–38 (8th Cir. 2011); Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Children of the World 
Found., Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484, 494 (D.N.J. 2000); Cancer Research Inst., Inc. v. 
Cancer Research Soc’y, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1051, 1055–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
117 Children of the World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
118 Id. 
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rights to the name “Children of the World,” but offered evidence show-
ing that it had operated using this name for nearly thirty years.119 The 
defendant organization, which was two years old at the time, also pro-
vided congenital heart surgeries to needy children in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe and had a registered trademark for “Children of 
the World Foundation.”120 
 The court reasoned that the older Children of the World organiza-
tion would likely succeed on the merits of trademark infringement and 
dilution claims, and that it would suffer irreparable harm to its ability 
to distinguish its services and to prevent dilution of goodwill associated 
with the mark.121 Considering the likelihood of whether an average in-
dividual would “confuse or associate the parties’ services and marks 
with one another based on the overall impression created by the mark 
as a whole,” the court found that the marks were confusingly similar, as 
the names were not identical, but very close to one another, and the 
organizations directly competed for the same donors.122 
 The court also found that allowing two similarly named organiza-
tions fighting for a similar cause to exist concurrently would be likely to 
dilute the plaintiff’s goodwill with donors, as it was well established as 
the only program of that name for twenty-eight years.123 The plaintiff’s 
organization was relatively famous for a number of years before the de-
fendant arrived on the scene and the court believed that the similarity 
between the two organization’s names would lessen the plaintiff’s ca-
pacity to distinguish its organization and services.124 
 Some courts, including the Children of the World court, have found 
an increased likelihood of confusion when the senior mark is fa-
mous.125 These courts reasoned that when a mark is well-known to a 
                                                                                                                      
 
119 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2006); supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining that although trademark registration provides certain benefits, no official regis-
tration is necessary to establish trademark rights). 
120 Children of the World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
121 Id. at 493. 
122 Id. at 491. 
123 Id. at 493. 
124 See id. (“If permitted to continue, it is probable that defendants’ use of the confus-
ingly similar mark for essentially the same services (charitable and medical) will cause 
actual lessening of plaintiff’s capacity to distinguish its own senior program from the de-
fendants’ emerging program. Plaintiff will increasingly be called upon to explain that its 
program is not related to the New York program, and that task will be increasingly burden-
some as defendants expand their publicity and fundraising activities.”). 
125 See Virgin Enters. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff’s VIRGIN 
mark was also famous. The mark had been employed with world-wide recognition as the 
mark of an airline and as the mark for megastores selling music recordings and consumer 
electronic equipment. The fame of the mark increased the likelihood that consumers see-
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large percentage of the general public, potential donors or buyers are 
far more likely to mentally connect the similar secondary use of a mark 
to the more recognizable senior trademark holder, thereby leaving it 
open for tarnishment by the secondary user.126 
 The Children of the World court was extremely concerned about this 
confusion in infringement cases involving nonprofits.127 The court as-
serted that nonprofit trademarks should receive enhanced judicial pro-
tection because of the public’s strong interest in ensuring that individ-
ual contributions are received by the intended organization.128 Further, 
the court determined that the prospective harm to the defendant or 
the greater public interest served by the defendant’s organization could 
be ameliorated simply by allowing for a short grace period while the 
defendant transitioned to a new, non-infringing name.129 
 A somewhat similar case arose in 2009, when the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Nebraska was presented with a nonprofit trademark 
battle in WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors, Inc.130 The two charitable or-
ganizations, both dedicated to supporting injured veterans, became 
locked in a lengthy litigation over allegedly misdirected donations and 
the domain name woundedwarriors.org.131 Wounded Warriors, Inc., an 
Omaha, Nebraska charity, owned the domain name but the Wounded 
Warrior Project of Jacksonville, Florida, a larger and older group, ar-
gued that scores of its supporters donated money to the other group’s 
site thinking it was going to the Florida charity, which owned the similar 
domain names, woundedwarrior.org and woundedwarriorproject.org.132 
Wounded Warriors Project contended that it had become “synonymous 
with veteran service to this generation of wounded veterans” due to ag-
gressive marketing and endorsements by Bob Costas, Bill O’Reilly, Jim-
                                                                                                                      
ing defendants’ shops selling telephones under the mark VIRGIN would assume incor-
rectly that defendant’s shops were a part of plaintiff’s organization.”); Lois Sportswear, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1986); Children of the World, 99 
F. Supp. 2d at 491–93. 
126 See Virgin Enters., 335 F.3d at 149; Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 873; Children of the 
World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 491–93. 
127 See Children of the World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 493–94. 
128 See id. at 494 (“[T]he public also has a right to know to whom they are giving their 
money and who is administering these services. When donors choose to give money to 
support [a specific organization], they should be assured they are [actually] giving it to the 
[intended organization] . . . . The consumers of these services should likewise know which 
organization is [assisting them].”). 
129 See id. 
130 WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors, Inc. (Wounded Warriors I ), 566 F. Supp. 2d 970, 
974 (D. Neb. 2008). 
131 Id.; see Wounded Warriors II, 628 F.3d at 1035–36; Marks, supra note 4. 
132 Wounded Warriors I, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 978–79. 
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my Buffet, and the NFL, whereas the other organization marketed itself 
only on its website.133 The organization alleged that this publicity 
prompted donors to mistakenly contribute to the other charity’s web-
site.134 
 Donations to Wounded Warriors, Inc. had increased dramatically 
since the launch of the woundedwarriors.org website and the organiza-
tion admitted during discovery that it had cashed checks for misdirected 
donations.135 A jury awarded a $1.7 million verdict to the plaintiff and 
issued a permanent injunction barring the use of the problematic do-
main name by the defendant.136 On appeal, the court upheld the jury 
verdict, citing the significant donation increases for the defendant and 
the much larger national profile of the Wounded Warrior Project.137 
Further, the verdict reiterated the strong public interest in donors’ gifts 
reaching their intended destination organizations.138 
 Usually, however, trademark disputes like the ones in Children of the 
World and Wounded Warriors settle before proceeding to court.139 A re-
cent example of such a dispute involved the federally trademarked 
“Sunshine Kids Foundation,” an organization which puts on recrea-
tional programming nationwide for children with cancer.140 The Sun-
shine Kids Foundation filed suit against the Sunshine Kids Club of Cali-
fornia, which provides programming for children with disabilities, 
when it discovered that multiple donors had unintentionally sent mon-
ey to the California organization, believing it was affiliated with the 
Sunshine Kids Foundation.141 The California group drained a large 
percentage of its resources in fighting a name change before heeding 
                                                                                                                      
133 Wounded Warriors II, 628 F.3d at 1035. 
134 Id. at 1036. 
135 Id. The district court declined to conduct a full likelihood of confusion analysis be-
cause the defendant openly admitted that there had been some donor confusion. See 
Wounded Warriors I, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 975. The court also found that Wounded Warriors, 
Inc. was in violation of the Nebraska Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which holds an organi-
zation liable for creating or actively participating in causing public confusion or misunder-
standing as to affiliation or connection with another entity. Id. at 977. 
136 Wounded Warriors II, 628 F.3d at 1035. 
137 See id. at 1037, 1041. 
138 See id. at 1043. 
139 See Ward, supra note 8, at 297 (discussing how many nonprofits opt to settle trade-
mark infringement claims to avoid incurring large legal fees); Meredith J. Cooper, Lawsuit 
Leads to Name Change, Chico News & Rev., Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.newsreview.com/ 
chico/lawsuit-leads-to-name-change/content?oid=1861771; Marks, supra note 4. 
140 See Cooper, supra, note 139. 
141 Id. 
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to counsel’s advice to end the legal proceeding by changing its name to 
Sunshine Connection.142 
 Although it is regrettable that the California group had to divert 
funding away from its worthwhile programming to wage a legal battle, 
it is likely, based on the existing case law, that, had the case progressed 
to trial, the court would have found for the federally trademarked Sun-
shine Kids Foundation because of concerns about donors confusing 
the smaller group with a more prominent organization.143 Thus, in opt-
ing to rebrand, the California Sunshine Kids likely saved itself from 
spending further resources on a fight that it was likely to lose.144 
B. The Komen Conundrum: Lawsuits for the Cure? 
 The most interesting and publicized recent dispute in the non-
profit trademark landscape involves Susan G. Komen for the Cure.145 
Komen is the most well-known and highly-funded organization devoted 
to fighting breast cancer in the world.146 Since its inception in 1982, 
Komen has invested over $1.9 billion in breast cancer research and ser-
vices for women affected by the disease.147 The organization funds pro-
grams in over fifty countries worldwide and is synonymous all over the 
world with breast cancer research and awareness.148 In a January 2010 
survey of over nine thousand American consumers, Komen was ranked 
as the second most-trusted nonprofit brand and was the number one 
charity to which respondents said they would direct their dollars, a dis-
tinction the organization has held for three years.149 
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143 See Wounded Warriors II, 628 F.3d at 1035–36, 1043; Children of the World, 99 F. 
Supp. 2d at 493–94; Cancer Research Inst., 694 F. Supp. at 1055–56. 
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146 Gayle A. Sulik, Pink Ribbon Blues 149–50 (2011) (“Komen has the greatest 
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8, at 302. 
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Movement to End Breast Cancer 342 (2010). 
148 See Marks, supra note 4; Press Release, Susan G. Komen for the Cure, Susan G. Ko-
men for the Cure and World Health Leaders Launch Global Women’s Health Initiative 
( June 8, 2010). 
149 Heather Joslyn, Two Health Charities Rank as America’s Most Trusted Nonprofit Brands, 
Chron. Philanthropy (Mar. 4, 2010), http://philanthropy.com/article/Two-Health-Char 
ities-Rank-as/64512/. The organization held the number one distinction for three consecu-
tive years and ranks now only behind St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital in Memphis, TN, 
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 The organization’s signature event, the Susan G. Komen Race for 
the Cure, was first held in 1983 and is now the world’s largest breast 
cancer fundraising event.150 In 2010, there were 146 Komen races 
worldwide with over 1.6 million participants and one hundred thou-
sand volunteers.151 As the Race for the Cure increased in national and 
global prominence, Komen began registering trademarks for many of 
its other events including “Fly for the Cure,” “Craft for the Cure,” “Cou-
ture for the Cure,” “Ski for the Cure,” “Nurses for the Cure,” “Salsa Pa-
ra La Cure,” and “Collect for the Cure,” to name a few.152 Although 
Komen does not have a registered trademark for the phrase “for the 
cure,” a mark need not be registered to receive protection if it is suffi-
ciently tied to one source, and it is clear from the vast number of vari-
ous constructions of “for the cure” that the organization views the 
phrase as inextricably linked to its brand and fundraising potential.153 
 In August 2010, national media picked up a story outlining Ko-
men’s dispute with the organization “Uniting Against Lung Cancer,” 
which planned to hold an event entitled “Kites for a Cure.”154 Uniting 
Against Lung Cancer received a letter from Komen’s lawyers requesting 
that it change the name of the event to “Kites for a Cause,” or another 
name.155 The letter also warned the organization against any use of “for 
the cure” in conjunction with its signature color pink.156 Uniting Against 
Lung Cancer refused to change the event name and retained its own 
attorneys.157 After many months, the organization reached a settlement 
with Komen in which they agreed to only use the phrase “for a Cure” in 
conjunction with the words “lung cancer” to make the distinction 
clear.158 
 Later the same year, Sue Prom, who started a small dog sledding 
fundraiser for breast cancer called “Mush for the Cure” received a let-
ter from Komen’s attorneys, challenging her application for a trade-
                                                                                                                      
which is similar to Komen in terms of national presence and major marketing initiatives. Id. 
Additionally, Nancy G. Brinker, Komen’s founder and CEO, received the Presidential Medal 
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mark and requesting that she change the name of her event because 
the two organizations fundraise for the same cause.159 Prom, whose 
event raises money for the National Breast Cancer Foundation (NBCF), 
was urged by the NBCF to apply for a trademark to protect the event in 
the hopes of avoiding dealings with the Komen legal team.160 
 Just a few months after being named one of America’s most trust-
ed charities, Komen’s new label as a trademark bully dealt a serious 
blow to its carefully crafted image.161 Prom told her story to the na-
tional press, explaining that her organization could not afford to re-
brand apparel and posters or to fight Komen in court.162 She accused 
Komen of using donor funds, which should go to the fight against 
breast cancer, for legal battles.163 As the story gained momentum, Ko-
men found itself facing a significant public backlash.164 
 Komen’s attorney insisted that the organization tried to be “rea-
sonable” and never had shut down or intended to shut down any small-
er charity.165 The company issued a statement saying that the steps it 
took to protect its trademarks were simply to avoid donor confusion, 
which is a common problem with similarly named organizations.166 
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Still, shortly after Prom’s appearance on the NBC Nightly News and 
amid an onslaught of negative publicity, including a front page Wall 
Street Journal article and a lampoon by Steven Colbert, Komen with-
drew its opposition to the Mush for a Cure trademark application.167 
III. Clarifying the Confusion: How Fairly to Apply Trademark 
Law in Cases Involving Charitable Organizations 
 The timing of Komen’s decision to withdraw its objection to Mush 
for a Cure’s name strongly indicates that Komen’s decision was moti-
vated by bad press and was not related to the merits of its claim.168 Al-
though Komen may have made a smart business decision, the organiza-
tion had every reason to protect its brand from another group using a 
similar name.169 The potential for confusion is quite clear—a donor 
looking for a charity funding research and support for breast cancer 
patients could reasonably assume that an organization with “for a cure” 
or “for the cure” was affiliated with the well-known Susan G. Komen for 
the Cure or one of its many subgroups like Nurses for the Cure or Ski 
for the Cure.170 Further, in the case of famous nonprofits, it seems 
highly likely that where there are concerns about confusion, there 
would be simultaneous concerns about dilution of an organization’s 
reputation.171 
                                                                                                                     
 This Part argues that nonprofits require their own set of trademark 
rules with some enhanced protections because their objectives are 
 
treat breast cancer and to fund the best scientific research bringing us closer 
to the cure. 
Id. 
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markedly different from the commercial businesses that were at the 
forefront of the minds of the legislators who drafted the Lanham 
Act.172 Section A discusses how nonprofits are different from commer-
cial organizations, and why they therefore require different protec-
tions.173 Section B advocates moving away from the multi-factor tests for 
confusion claims, as they are designed for the commercial sector, as 
well as for restricting the holding in KP Make-Up, which allows for a fair 
use defense to trademark infringement even where marks are confus-
ingly similar, to cases involving for-profit companies.174 Section C pro-
poses an amendment to the Lanham Act that would allow nonprofits to 
bring dilution claims, which they are barred from doing under current 
law.175 These proposed changes, though small, would help to ensure 
that large charitable organizations like Komen, whose work is hugely 
beneficial to society, are adequately protected from losing donations 
due to donor confusion and from harm to their brand reputation be-
cause of dilution.176 Finally, Section D explores how to protect smaller 
nonprofits that often face much larger, well-known organizations in 
trademark disputes, so that they are not burdened by litigation and can 
focus their considerably smaller war chests on their charitable goals.177 
                                                                                                                     
A. Why the Law Needs to Protect “For the Cure” and Its Valuable Counterparts 
 Nonprofit organizations need and deserve specialized trademark 
protection because their work benefits more than just one business or 
company and is distinctly different than the for-profit model that Con-
gress had in mind when designing the Lanham Act.178 Charities work 
to perform a social good, not to turn a profit.179 Accordingly, the law 
should seek to avoid both the public confusion that leads to donations 
ending up in the wrong hands and the tarnishment of a mark that oc-
 
172 See infra notes 178–218 and accompanying text. 
173 See infra notes 178–186 and accompanying text. 
174 See infra notes 187–197 and accompanying text. 
175 See infra notes 198–206 and accompanying text. 
176 See infra notes 198–206 and accompanying text. 
177 See infra notes 207–218 and accompanying text. 
178 John Palfrey, Intellectual Property Strategy 110 (2011) (noting how non-
profits have a greater range of goals than for-profit businesses, which increases their need 
for a strong intellectual property strategy); see McCarthy, supra note 23, at 2:33 (explain-
ing how the Lanham Act was designed to protect producers and consumers). 
179 See Children of the World, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 494; Palfrey, supra note 178, at 110. 
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curs when the public mistakenly associates a respected organization 
with a lesser one.180 
 Although the basic concern is the same for nonprofits as for com-
mercial enterprises, namely that confusion will result in money being 
funneled to incorrect recipients, the problem of misdirected funds is 
graver in the nonprofit context.181 Because both nonprofit and for-
profit organizations invest substantial resources to develop strong 
marks, there should be greater concern when philanthropic donations 
reach the wrong destination, as opposed to when a consumer pur-
chases the wrong product because two logos look alike.182 As the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey observed in 2000 in Deborah 
Heart & Lung Center v. Children of the World Foundation, there is a strong 
public interest in ensuring that donors, who are performing a social 
good, receive assurance that their money is going to its intended desti-
nation, which will make them more likely to donate in the future.183 
 Further, donors generally would like their money to run to its 
highest and best use, which might be to the well-established charities 
with the scale and scope to help more people.184 Larger, more far-
reaching organizations have more at stake in maintaining their good 
reputations.185 Therefore, because of the strong public interest in en-
suring that potential donors can rely on marks to identify organizations 
and that large, trusted nonprofits are protected from reputational 
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harm, nonprofits require their own trademark rules that provide en-
hanced protection for larger organizations.186 
B. Fixing the Confusing Confusion Standard 
 Case law indicates that the likelihood of confusion between differ-
ent nonprofits using similar marks is great, especially where the two 
groups are working on behalf of similar causes.187 In analyzing the like-
lihood of confusion, the circuits use different multi-factor tests.188 
Some courts weigh certain factors more heavily than others, often giv-
ing greater weight to how the two marks relate in the commercial mar-
ketplace.189 Ideally, a new section of the Lanham Act, dealing exclu-
sively with nonprofits, would still allow confusion claims, but the courts 
would not use the multi-factor tests and instead would perform a case-
by-case analysis of the pertinent facts and circumstances.190 This type of 
case-by-case analysis works best in the context of nonprofit trademarks 
because these cases are often not litigated to a final judgment, and it is 
therefore unlikely that a court could reliably promulgate a test based 
on a small sample of prior decisions.191 
                                                                                                                     
 Further, a new nonprofit amendment to the Lanham Act should 
not allow a fair use defense where there is any potential for confusion 
between nonprofit groups, thereby effectively limiting to the commer-
cial world the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 holding in KP Permanent 
Make-Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., which allowed an infringing defen-
dant to prevail on a fair use defense,192 even where some confusion was 
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likely.193 In that case, two similar companies marketing permanent 
make-up products to individuals trying to cover up scars became locked 
in a dispute over the term “microcolors.”194 The KP Make-Up court held 
that a fair use defense could succeed even where some source confu-
sion is present.195 
 KP Make-Up, and similar cases in which a consumer may be con-
fused as to the source of a product but ultimately ends up with a similar 
product, is vastly different than nonprofit trademark confusion cases in 
which larger charitable organizations could potentially lose money and 
donors’ money falls into the wrong hands.196 The potential social harm 
of allowing confusion in these cases is much more significant, and thus 
the KP Make-Up holding, which allows for some consumer confusion, 
should not apply to nonprofit trademarks.197 
C. Allowing Dilution Claims in the Nonprofit Context 
 The legislative history behind the anti-dilution amendments clear-
ly indicates that Congress intended to significantly expand federal stat-
utory protection for senior trademark holders.198 Komen and other 
large, well-known nonprofits are exactly the types of organizations that 
could be seriously affected by dilution.199 The Lanham Act, however, 
requires that dilutive acts be “commercial” in nature.200 This language 
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could be construed to exclude charitable nonprofits from raising dilu-
tion claims, even though the legislative intent seemingly aims to protect 
all well-known or famous marks.201 At least one court has allowed a 
nonprofit organization to prevail on a dilution claim, but the current 
Lanham Act does not guarantee that nonprofits in other jurisdictions 
would be successful in bringing dilution claims.202 
 The nonprofit amendment to the Lanham Act would allow chari-
table organizations to bring dilution claims, without requiring courts to 
grapple with whether the use of a mark was commercial enough in na-
ture to fall under § 1125(c).203 Dilution can seriously chip away at the 
work and reputation of large, well-known organizations, and is a serious 
concern for a famous group like Komen.204 Even where there is not 
confusion as to the source of a mark, dilution reduces the ability of the 
famous mark to identify the organization behind the mark, thereby 
tarnishing the effectiveness of the mark and undercutting the organiza-
tion’s investment in creating and publicizing the mark.205 Moreover, 
allowing these dilution claims furthers the clear legislative intent of ex-
panding trademark protection for highly recognizable marks.206 
D. Preventing Trademark “Bullying” 
 When the Komen trademark disputes story was picked up by the 
national media in early 2011, the narrative seemed largely the same in 
every piece—the large nonprofit with extensive resources was “bullying” 
a smaller group that was also trying to fight for the same cause.207 In 
reality, Komen was not trying to shut down or bankrupt other charities, 
but was protecting its well-established reputation because of legitimate 
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concerns about misdirected donations and dilution.208 Although the 
trademark bully label might have been unfair, it is cause for concern 
that smaller organizations, which have less resources and less access to 
legal expertise, could be pulled into court for burdensome litigation.209 
 The smaller groups, though, do have the protection of § 1117 of 
the Lanham Act, which awards attorney’s fees to defendants in cases of 
gross misuse of the statutory protections in which trademark holders 
have frivolously or maliciously attacked another entity.210 Although this 
provision does not prevent all smaller groups from being subject to liti-
gation, it does punish those trademark holders who bring trademark 
actions in bad-faith.211 
 In addition to this recourse, a change could be made to the appli-
cation process for charitable groups filing for favorable federal tax-
exempt status.212 To gain this favorable tax status, new charitable or-
ganizations must fill out a lengthy application questionnaire detailing 
financial information, charitable goals, and specific activities.213 The 
questionnaire also asks whether the new group owns any intellectual 
property, including trademarks.214 Amending this questionnaire to re-
quire that any new charitable organization search its name and any 
other identifying mark on the U.S. Trademark registration site before 
proceeding with its application could help cut down on nonprofit 
trademark infringement.215 This search requirement would provide 
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notice to groups that they might want to seek permission before using a 
mark to avoid a possible infringement action.216 
 This amendment to the 501(c)(3) application would in no way 
eliminate all trademark infringement, but it might scale back some in-
fringement on the part of smaller groups, thereby reducing the number 
of cease and desist letters sent by larger organizations like Komen.217 In 
turn, fewer large nonprofits would be labeled as trademark bullies and 
feel obligated to withdraw their potentially legitimate claims because of 
bad press, even when they are simply trying to maintain goodwill with 
established donors and carry out their laudable objectives.218 
Conclusion 
 The 2011 media storm that besieged Susan G. Komen for the Cure 
when it attempted to assert and defend its trademark highlights a need 
for trademark law amendments that apply specifically to nonprofits. 
The Lanham Act, designed over fifty years ago with the commercial 
sector in mind, did not envision large nonprofits that operate remarka-
bly like businesses, but with vastly different goals. As a result, nonprofit 
trademark holders must navigate a confusing intellectual property 
landscape, never entirely sure whether or not the law does or should 
apply to them. The potential for brand tarnishment of well-established 
groups that are often in the position to help the greatest number of 
people and deserve to have their reputation protected, is great. Fur-
ther, there is a strong public interest in ensuring that when people 
make charitable contributions, the funds reach their intended destina-
tions and the public feels confident enough to donate again, thereby 
facilitating further social good. 
 A small amendment to the Lanham Act indicating that, in the case 
of nonprofits, donor confusion is not acceptable and that dilution 
claims are not limited to the commercial sector would not only allow 
charitable organizations to better protect their marks, but would also 
provide some much-needed clarity. As nonprofits continue to grow and 
are able to reach more and more citizens due to the Internet and social 
media, the time is ripe to revisit this issue and establish guidelines for 
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these organizations, so that they can worry less about legal problems 
and focus more on their laudable social goals. 
Lauren Behr 
